S and I represent the proportion of the population susceptible and infectious, respectively. U represents the proportion dead and recovered, with the number dead dependent on the speci®c case fatality rates given in the data sets. The contacts of cases are divided into the following classes: E n the number of untraced latent individuals in the population, E i the number of traced latent contacts, and C i the number of traced uninfected contacts. The ®nal class of contacts are those untraced and uninfected and so effectively remaining in S. Q represents the proportion in quarantine and V the proportion protected by vaccination. The average rate at which latent individuals become infectious 13, 21 is a latency period 21 0:0685 days 21 and the rate at which infectious individuals in the community recover or die 22 is g infectious period 21 0:116 days 21 . Two states of quarantine are de®ned: the ®rst for the traced contacts successfully vaccinated and released into the community at a rate x 1 , and the second for the infectious cases, which enter U at a rate x 2 . Different vaccine ef®cacies are assumed for those uninfected, e 1 , and infected, e 2 . The proportion of contacts found through contact tracing is r and the daily rate at which infectious individuals enter quarantine from the community is v. The proportion of contacts infected is de®ned as J. The rate at which potentially infected contacts occur is de®ned as b, as in equation (2) , and N is the size of the population in which the epidemic occurs.
Additional assumptions are that no transmission occurs from those quarantined, dead or recovered and the background mortality rate was assumed to be negligible over the time periods examined. For the Boston, Burford, Warrington and Chester data sets, r v 0, which effectively reduces equations (1) above to a simple SEIR model 9 . Intervention parameters were only required when equations (1) was ®tted to the data from Kosovo. Here, interventions were implemented 31 days after the onset of symptoms in the index case 1 with the associated parameters shown in Table 2 . The number of potentially infected contacts per case was determined as 50 (ref. 1) . Values of R 0 were derived for each outbreak by minimizing the mean square error between the mortality data and the predictions of mortality from the model, while applying the outbreak-speci®c case fatality rates to U and adjusting R 0 and time of onset of symptoms in the index case. In the case of Kosovo, equations (1) were ®tted more simply to the reported number of cases rather than deaths. All the other parameters required for equations (1) were obtained independently from the published source(s) given in Table 1 . For epidemics in London, R 0 was roughly calculated from the interepidemic interval, T 2pLD D9=R 0 2 1 1=2 , where L is life expectancy between 1840 and 1870 adjusted for excess births over deaths, equal to 25 years, and D D9 is latent infectious period, equal to 0.063 years 9 .
Estimation of current vaccination coverage
Given that smallpox vaccination ceased in industrialized countries in the mid to late 1970s (ref. 13 ), a crude estimate of the immunity of the contemporary UK population was calculated, on the basis of 50% having been vaccinated as infants up to 1972, and estimating that about 60% of these would be alive today from current population statistics. Of these only about 60% would still be protected by the vaccinations done on average 50 years previously, calculated by extrapolating from data on secondary attack rates, which increased from 4 to 12% over 10 years following vaccination 23 . This suggests that the level of herd immunity may be about 18%, which will continue to decrease with time.
Vaccines rarely provide full protection from disease. Nevertheless, partially effective (imperfect) vaccines may be used to protect both individuals and whole populations 1±3 . We studied the potential impact of different types of imperfect vaccines on the evolution of pathogen virulence (induced host mortality) and the consequences for public health. Here we show that vaccines designed to reduce pathogen growth rate and/or toxicity diminish selection against virulent pathogens. The subsequent evolution leads to higher levels of intrinsic virulence and hence to more severe disease in unvaccinated individuals. This evolution can erode any population-wide bene®ts such that overall mortality rates are unaffected, or even increase, with the level of vaccination coverage. In contrast, infection-blocking vaccines induce no such effects, and can even select for lower virulence. These ®ndings have policy implications for the development and use of vaccines that are not expected to provide full immunity, such as candidate vaccines for malaria 4 . Previous studies on the evolution of vaccine resistance have focused on the spread of`escape' mutants that display epitopes different to those in the vaccine, thereby escaping immune recognition 5±7 Ðthis has already happened for polio 8 and hepatitis B 9 . New vaccines may eventually get around this problem by, for example, targeting conserved epitopes or multiple epitopes simultaneously. Here we study an alternative counter-adaptation to vaccination involving pathogen life-history traits, namely virulence (induced host mortality) and transmission rate. To address this issue we incorporated standard evolutionary theory for virulence evolution 10±12 into an epidemiological framework 1 . We begin with an analysis of the evolution of parasite virulence (the disease-induced mortality rate of the host) in a homogeneous host population. We do this by studying the ability of a rare mutant, with virulence denoted a*, to invade a population of resident parasites with virulence a (the asterisk distinguishes the mutant's trait from the resident's). The evolutionarily stable (ES) pathogen virulence can be found by maximizing the mutant pathogen's R 0 [a*,a] at a a*. (See equation (1) below.) When the host population is homogeneous and has reached epidemiological equilibrium (as denoted by the circum¯ex accent (`hat' symbol) throughout), the expression for the mutant's ®tness is given by the expected number of secondary cases produced by a single host infected by this mutant over its entire infectious period 10±13 :
R 0 a*; a b*Ã x jÃ y d a* x* j Ã h 1 where x and y are the densities of uninfected and infected hosts, respectively, b is the pathogen's transmission rate, h by is the rate at which hosts acquire new infections (termed`the force of infection'), x is the pathogen's clearance rate (rate at which the host becomes non-infectious), d is the host's natural mortality rate, and j is the ef®ciency with which the pathogen invades an already infected host (superinfection) relative to invading an uninfected host 13, 14 . The superinfection parameter, j, can also be modelled as a function of virulence 13 , but here, for simplicity, we assume it to be a constant. It is assumed that superinfecting parasites immediately replace the strain already present in the host: thus sh is the rate at which the pathogen is cleared from the host due to arrival of another strain. Note that h Ã is determined by the resident pathogen strain. Thus, by setting the density of infected hosts to zero, we recover the classical de®nition of R 0 , which allows us to tell whether the mutant pathogen can invade a fully susceptible host population 1 . Here we assume, as in classical models of the evolution of virulence 10±14 , that the pathogen ®tness function in equation (1) includes trade-offs involving pathogen virulenceÐthat is, virulence has bene®cial, pleiotropic effects on other pathogen life-history traits that offset the ®tness cost of host death (which prematurely ends the infectious period). Two types of virulence bene®ts have been proposed. First, transmission rate is assumed to be an increasing function of pathogen virulence. Second, clearance rate is assumed to be slower with higher virulence. The net result of these negative and positive in¯uences on pathogen ®tness is that there is an intermediate optimum level of virulence that maximizes ®tness. Although there are few data testing these assumed ®tness relationships in pathogens, they are generally supportive 10, 15, 16 . The exact nature of these relationships will depend on the biology of each particular host±pathogen interaction, but here we de®ne these trade-offs in simple forms by:
where the coef®cients with subscripts are constants that determine the shape of the trade-offs, and hence the value of a that maximizes ®tness.
The question now is how does host immunity (or`resistance') change the optimum virulence relative to that in a completely nonimmune (`susceptible') host population? Still assuming a homogeneous host population, we consider four different forms of immunity, with ef®cacies denoted r 1 , r 2 , r 3 and r 4 , which independently affect different stages of the pathogen's life cycle (Fig. 1) . The ®rst is anti-infection immunity, which decreases the probability that a host becomes infected. The second is anti-growth-rate immunity, which directly reduces virulence and concomitantly affects transmission rate and host recovery. The third is transmission-blocking immunity, which only decreases parasite transmission. The fourth is anti-toxin immunity which directly reduces virulence but, contrary to anti-growth-rate immunity, does not affect parasite transmission and host recovery rates. This yields:
where the prime pertains to immune hosts. Assuming that only the trade-off between virulence and transmission is operating (clearance rate, x, is a constant), yields the ES virulence:
Note that, throughout, virulence is measured as induced host mortality in susceptible (non-immune) hosts. Equation (4) implies that anti-growth-rate and anti-toxin immunity (modelled by r 2 and r 4 ) always select for higher virulence. This is because they reduce the risk of host death and hence selection against more virulent mutants. Indeed, evolution will restore the virulence observed in a uniform population of resistant hosts, as well as the force of infection, to that observed in a uniform population of susceptible hosts by increasing intrinsic virulence (that is, virulence as measured in susceptible hosts). Thus a pathogen following a strategy that would generate optimal virulence in a resistant host will induce a higher-than-optimal virulence in a susceptible host 17 . In contrast, anti-infection (r 1 ) and transmission-blocking (r 3 ) immunity select for lower virulence whenever there is superinfection, and leave it unchanged otherwise. They act indirectly on the evolution of parasite virulence via the force of infection through their effects on the rate at which an infection is prematurely ended by the arrival of a superinfecting pathogen 14, 17 . Although equation (4) de®nes the ES virulence as a function of the force of infection, which is itself a function of virulence, the results discussed above can be rigorously proven using implicit differentiation analysis (not shown).
If we alternatively assume that there is only a trade-off between virulence and recovery rate, the ES virulence is:
In this case, anti-growth and anti-toxin immunity increase virulence, and the other two forms of immunity have no effect. When both trade-offs are included, the conclusions derived from equation (4) do not qualitatively change. What, then, if the pathogen faces a heterogeneous population of susceptible and resistant hosts, as would happen if a vaccination programme was implemented? On the one hand, we have shown that the consequences of vaccinating individual hosts is to select for higher levels of intrinsic virulence in the case of anti-growth-rate and anti-toxin vaccines. On the other hand, immunized hosts will transmit less, die less and recover more quickly than non-immune hosts, thus reducing the overall level of disease in the population. We now allow this epidemiology to feed back into the pathogen's virulence evolution, and vice versa, in order to determine the overall impact of vaccination programmes on the health of the population. The epidemiological model that we used was a modi®ed version of the standard susceptible-infected model 1 
where l is a constant rate of¯ow (which covers both reproduction and immigration) of uninfected hosts into the population, among which a fraction f are resistant, that is, vaccinated, and the forces of infection on susceptible and resistant hosts become h by b9y9 and h9 1 2 r 1 h, respectively. Note that there are no terms for superinfection in equation (6) as these cancel out. For simplicity, we assume that resistant hosts do not lose immunity to become susceptible, and, except by vaccination, susceptible hosts do not acquire immunity. This latter assumption is relaxed in our malaria example below.
As for the simple homogeneous case, the ES parasite virulence is found by maximizing at a a*:
which can be seen as a weighted average of the per-host transmission factors 18 on susceptible and resistant hosts (see Supplementary Information). Equations (6) and (7) can then be solved jointly to yield the ES virulence and population prevalence of disease once evolution has occurred.
A numerical example shows that as the ef®cacy of anti-growthrate and anti-toxin vaccines increases, there is a marked increase in virulence (Fig. 2a ). An exception occurs for very high ef®cacy antigrowth-rate vaccines, because the contribution to ®tness from vaccinated individuals becomes very small (see Supplementary  Information) . ES virulence always increases with the ef®cacy of anti-toxin vaccines, because this type of vaccine removes the cost of virulence (increased mortality) without affecting its bene®t (increased transmission). Consequently, the ®tness contribution of vaccinated hosts always increases with the ef®cacy of an antitoxin vaccine. In contrast, as the ef®cacy of anti-infection and antitransmission vaccines increases, pathogens will evolve lower levels of virulence if superinfection occurs (Fig. 2a) . This is because these vaccines reduce superinfection rates. When pathogens are less likely to be competitively excluded, the bene®ts of keeping the host alive are greater. The reduction in virulence is weaker for transmissionblocking vaccines than for infection-blocking vaccines because, with transmission-blocking vaccines, vaccinated hosts are fully susceptible to infection. Consequently, the force of infection is higher and this selects for higher virulence levels. When vaccines are fully effective (`perfect'), all except the anti-toxin vaccines share the same ES virulence. When superinfection occurs, this level falls below the virulence reached when vaccines are never used (or are totally ineffective). This is because, with a perfect vaccine, vaccinated hosts do not transmit the disease and, through the decrease of the force of infection, serve to indirectly favour lower virulence 17, 19 . A perfect anti-toxin vaccine (a vaccine that completely removes the deleterious effects of the parasite on its host) does not decrease transmission and always selects for extreme intrinsic virulence (Fig. 2a) .
In addition to virulence consequences, vaccination changes disease prevalence. Figure 2b shows that as vaccination coverage increases, anti-infection and anti-transmission vaccines always reduce disease prevalence when pathogen evolution occurs, and can sometimes eliminate the disease. Anti-growth-rate vaccines, on the other hand, have hardly any effect on prevalence because of a balance between two forces that act in different directionsÐ reduced transmission due to the direct effect of the vaccine and increased transmission through the evolution of higher virulence in vaccinated hosts. Anti-toxin vaccines may be even worse. Because these vaccines do not reduce transmission rate, increased vaccination coverage can increase pathogen prevalence above pre-vaccination levels.
The above evolutionary analysis assumes that hosts and pathogens are in population dynamic equilibrium. Extensive numerical simulations indicate that our model generates simple dynamics of rapid approaches to a stable point equilibrium. Many diseases, however, have more complex epidemiological dynamics, which may exhibit cycles or chaotic behaviour. Even if there is a point attractor, the transient dynamics following vaccination may be so pronounced or so long-lasting that an analysis based on equilibrium conditions may be irrelevant. In these situations, the selective pressures would vary both in space (from one host to another) and time, and the evolutionary analysis would need to take into account the effects of such variability on the invasion exponent of a mutant parasite 20 . Although a single epidemiological equilibrium exists, the evolutionary analysis of our model revealed that there could be different evolutionary outcomes depending on the initial conditions. Such evolutionary bistability emerges when the parasite can take an evolutionary route that leads to specialization on either susceptible or resistant hosts (leading to low or high virulence, respectively). However, our predictions regarding the effects of imperfect vaccines are not qualitatively altered by evolutionary bistability.
This result has potentially important implications for the evolution of specialization 21, 22 and for the evolution of multihost pathogens 23 , but further exploration of this phenomenon falls outside the scope of the present Letter.
Can the above general theory for a virtual pathogen contribute to the rational design of vaccines against real pathogens such as malaria parasites? Current efforts to develop a malaria vaccine are focused on three different stages of the parasite's life cycleÐthe preerythrocytic stages (sporozoites and liver-stage parasites), asexual blood-stage parasites (merozoites and infected erythrocytes) and the mosquito-stage parasites (gametocytes, gametes, ookinetes) 4 . Immunity against these three stages corresponds to the anti-infection, anti-growth-rate and transmission-blocking forms of resistance studied here. Anti-toxin malaria vaccines are also being explored 24 . Using a modi®ed form of the general model to incorporate two important features of malaria epidemiologyÐnaturally acquired immunity and vector transmission (see Supplementary Information)Ðwe evaluated the public health consequences of using various vaccines.
The model was parameterized using values typical of year-round endemic Plasmodium falciparum malaria in a high transmission area. Figure 3a±e shows that, as for the general model, the malaria model predicts that anti-growth-rate and anti-toxin vaccines select for higher virulence, while anti-infection vaccines select for lower parasite virulence. In the malaria model, however, transmissionblocking vaccines may favour slightly higher virulence (Fig. 3c) . This vaccine reduces transmission and, consequently, the reproduc- tive value of parasites infecting vaccinated hosts. In this case, evolution becomes mainly driven by the selective pressures occurring in naturally immune hosts. This explains the increase in virulence in spite of the indirect effect of superinfection acting in the opposite direction (equation (4)). We also examined the evolutionary consequences of a combination of different types of vaccines. The use of a vaccine combining the four different types also favours higher pathogen virulence despite the bene®cial effect of anti-infection vaccines (Fig. 3e) .
With or without evolution of the pathogen, vaccination is expected to affect the prevalence of malaria. As in the general model (Fig. 2b) , the use of anti-infection and transmission-blocking vaccines reduces the force of infection and consequently malaria prevalence (Fig. 3f, h ). In contrast, anti-growth-rate and anti-toxin vaccines have hardly any effect on prevalence (Fig. 3g, i) . A combination vaccine, via the anti-infection and transmissionblocking effects, is the most ef®cient in reducing malaria prevalence, and could even lead to eradication for extreme vaccine coverage (Fig. 3j) .
The total number of deaths due to malaria depends on both malaria virulence and on the prevalence of infection in the different types of hosts. Figure 3k±o presents the consequences of vaccination at the level of the whole host population. In the absence of pathogen evolution, not surprisingly, all the different types of vaccines decrease the total disease mortality. However, with antigrowth-rate, anti-toxin and transmission-blocking vaccines, evolution towards higher virulence (Fig. 3b±d) erodes the overall bene®ts of vaccination (Fig. 3l±n) . In contrast, when anti-infection vaccines are used, evolution towards lower virulence (Fig. 3a ) may increase the population-level bene®ts of vaccination (Fig. 3k) . At high vaccination coverage, a vaccine that incorporates all four types of vaccines would be the most ef®cient, even when evolution occurs (Fig. 3o) . This result supports the development of multivalent, multi-stage vaccines which, it is hoped, will provide greater overall protection than single-target vaccines 4 . Our ®nding that antiinfection vaccines may have favourable effects on virulence evolution also strongly supports the use of other partially effective control methods (for example, bed nets, mosquito control) to enhance the long-term bene®ts of vaccination.
How long might such virulence evolution take? Given that genetic variation exists for pathogen virulence 10, 15, 16, 25, 26 , one might expect that, like the evolution of vaccine and drug resistance, the evolution of virulence would occur on timescales that are relevant to public health (decades or less). As an explicit example, we used the malaria model to track the spread of a virulence mutant through time following the start of a vaccination campaign. At 90% vaccine coverage with an anti-growth-rate vaccine of 80% ef®cacy, it took 38 years for a mutant more than twice as virulent to increase from 1% to 50%, after which it spread towards ®xation very rapidly (see Supplementary Information). Numerical simulations, however, indicate that the speed of invasion is very sensitive to the shape of the trade-off function. Accurate predictions of both the invasion dynamics of a virulence mutant and of the evolutionary outcome require further investigation of the shape of these trade-off functions.
Purely epidemiological models have demonstrated that vaccines which are protective for individuals in clinical trials can nonetheless generate unwelcome consequences for a population as a whole 2, 3 . Our incorporation of evolution into the analysis shows that clinically detrimental or bene®cial evolution can also occur. The direction of virulence evolution depends critically on the type of vaccine, with several types promoting evolution that increases mortality risk to individual hosts. However, virulence management (an application of darwinian medicine 27, 28 ) requires speci®c models to answer questions regarding speci®c biological systems. Using malaria as an example, we found that the wide-scale use of even reasonably effective anti-growth-rate and transmission-blocking vaccines may ultimately do little to relieve community disease levels in malaria-endemic areas. Moreover, the evolution prompted by anti-growth-rate and anti-toxin vaccines can substantially increase the risk for non-immune individuals, such as unvaccinated children and non-immune travellers. The widespread use of such vaccines thus raises dif®cult ethical issues. Nevertheless, it is probable that anti-disease vaccines (anti-growth-rate and anti-toxin) will be used widely for their short-term bene®cial effect at the individual level.
Like drug resistance, the clinically detrimental evolution that we are discussing here will occur on timescales longer than those of clinical trials. Marked increases in virulence of some viral diseases have already followed widespread use of anti-growth-rate vaccines in the chicken industry 29 . When human populations become uncontrolled experimental systems, we recommend that at the very least, intrinsic virulence of the pathogen population (or more realistically, putative virulence determinants such as in vitro multiplication rates 30 ) be closely monitored.
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